We propose a mechanism for an m-party dishonest majority Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocol to obtain the required preprocessing data (called Beaver Triples), from a subset of a set of cloud service providers; providing a form of TaaS (Triples-as-a-Service). The service providers used by the MPC computing parties can be selected dynamically at the point of the MPC computation being run, and the interaction between the MPC parties and the TaaS parties is via a single round of communication, logged on a public ledger. The TaaS is itself instantiated as an MPC protocol which produces the triples for a different access structure. Thus our protocol also acts as a translation mechanism between the secret sharing used by one MPC protocol and the other.
INTRODUCTION
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) enables a set of parties to securely compute a function on their private inputs, revealing no more than what is revealed by the output of the function. Such computations are however often expensive. In the late 1990's Beaver [3] had already thought about the complexity that stems from general cryptographic computation, and to remedy this problem he defined what he called commodity-based cryptography, related to the notion of beacons introduced by Rabin [19] . The high level idea of commodity-based cryptography is to have commodity servers establishing shared resources for a group of computing parties. The commodity servers do not take part in the actual computation of Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. CCSW '19, November 11, 2019 , London, United Kingdom © 2019 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM. ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6826-1/19/11. . . $15.00 https://doi.org/10.1145/3338466.3358918 the cryptographic primitive, but instead provide a resource which reduces the computational costs of the users of this commodity. In Beaver's commodity paradigm, the commodity servers need have no knowledge of each other, only that some parties asked them for resources. These commodity servers would then respond to the parties request with a single message containing correlated randomness independent of the parties inputs. In [3] Beaver proposes a protocol to achieve 2-party OT in the commodity setting, assuming passive corruption of one client and a minority of the commodity servers. Thus in modern parlance the commodity servers act like a set of cloud service providers which provide RaaS (Randomness-asa-Service) to a set of computing parties.
MPC is not new, it dates back to Yao's famous protocol [23] for solving the millionaire's problem, but was until very recently considered totally inefficient for practical applications. Over the last ten years there has been considerable work in bridging the gap between theory and practice. A notable variant of MPC which is particularly efficient, for many parties, is that of secret sharing based MPC. The rise of secret sharing based MPC can be linked with the pre-processing model, which was another introduction of Beaver [2] , and which was first efficiently implemented in the VIFF protocol [9] . In the pre-processing model, the protocol is split up into two distinct sub-protocols. In what we call an offline phase (or preprocessing), the parties interact with each other to emulate a trusted dealer that securely distributes correlated randomness. The offline phase is independent from the inputs of the parties and as such can be computed at any point prior the evaluation of the circuit. The correlated randomness produced during the pre-processing is then consumed in the so-called online phase. The online phase actually computes the function the parties agreed on. The advantage of considering MPC in the pre-processing model, much alike the RaaS setting, is that we can outsource all the cryptographically intensive computation to the offline phase. This allows us to have a very fast online phase, which usually consists essentially of information theoretic computation.
Early work, such as VIFF [9] considered the case of a semi-honest adversary, with a honest majority. That is an adversary that does not deviate from the protocol and can corrupt only a minority of parties. More recent work are able to defend against a much stronger and arguably more realistic malicious adversary, which can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol, with dishonest majority. The first modern work in secret sharing MPC against a malicious adversary that corrupts a majority of the parties is due to BDOZ [4] . However, since then the SPDZ [11] family of protocols has been able to achieve better results, replacing the pairwise MACs used in BDOZ by introducing a unique secretly shared MAC key amongst all the players. One of the major drawbacks of all those protocols is that the offline phase, which produces correlated randomness, is computationally heavy.
The correlated randomness produced by the offline phase, is (generally) so-called Beaver triples. These are sharings of two random values a and b, along with their shared product c = a · b. There are mainly two methods in the literature for generating such triples: homomorphic encryption, as presented in the original SPDZ protocol or Oblivious Transfer (OT) extensions proposed in the MASCOT [16] protocol, which improves on the work of Frederiksen et al [13] . Both these methods require very expensive public key cryptography, making the offline phase of SPDZ-like protocols order of magnitudes slower than the online one. We propose to produce these triples used by the computing parties as a third party Triples-as-a-Service (TaaS).
In [21] a similar methodology for outsourcing triple production was provided for the SPDZ family of protocols. However, in their work the computing parties have to be fixed and constant throughout the execution of the outsourcing protocol, thus the model does not directly map onto the commodity service idea of Beaver, nor is it suited for TaaS for cloud providers to sell. Other work has been done to outsource some parts of MPC protocols, with various goals in mind. Some tackle the problem of outsourcing garbled circuits generation [5] , or their evaluation [6, 14] . Others limit themselves to semi-honest adversaries [12, 20] or work in the specific two party case [7, 18] . Eventually there are also works which leverage the functionality of FHE to achieve outsourced MPC [1] . In our work we generalise the method of [21] to be closer to the original commodity model of Beaver. In particular we allow the commodity servers to do most of the computation regardless of which computing parties that will ask for their help. Thus, in our approach of commodity MPC, the set of computing parties can be dynamic. In addition the computing parties can also dynamically select which of the commodity servers (subject to some minor conditions) will be selected to produce the correlated randomness. Thus the resources produced by the commodity servers more closely match the definition of commodities as envisioned by Beaver. As a consequence, in our approach, the commodities can be seen as a service available in the cloud.
Contribution:
In this work we improve on the outsourcing model of [21] to better match the communication model envisioned in [3] . We present a method to outsource the pre-processing for the SPDZ family of protocols to a set of service providers. The main difference from [21] is that in our work we require the set of service providers to be able to communicate with each other only up to the commodity request. In addition the commodity servers are assumed to only have an honest majority, or more generally to follow a Q 2 access structure, as opposed to a dishonest majority (a Q 2 access structure is one in which no union of two unqualified subsets can form the whole set). In addition we will require an immutable, append only public ledger to log the transactions.
After receiving the request for correlated randomness from the group of computing parties via the ledger (one could think of using a smart contract on a public blockchain to achieve this), the service providers will only perform local computation and point-to-point communication with the later group to respond to these requests. The computing parties (the clients in our outsourcing model) can select which subset of commodity servers they wish to obtain data from.
We will denote by SP the set of n service providers that run (say) in the cloud, we assume these come defined with an access structure S which we assume is Q 2 . The set SP is the service provider in our TaaS application. There is in addition a set CP of m computing parties who wish to perform a secure computation. From SP a set SP r of r service providers are selected by the computing parties CP. The set SP r must be selected so that the access structure S restricted to SP r is also Q 2 .
A Q 2 sharing for the set SP instead of a full threshold sharing allows for the set of computing parties to interact with only a subset of the service providers while still being able to securely retrieve the required commodities. In addition, this stronger requirement allows the service providers to benefit from a somewhat cheaper MPC protocol. We can also argue that the computing parties could easily agree on some big corporation that provide web services to not be malicious when they act as service providers.
In our setting we let the adversary actively corrupt at most an unqualified set of parties from the service providers and m − 1 computing parties at the same time. In theory the choice of the access structure for SP and CP can be either Q 2 or full threshold as long as it implies an MPC protocol. However we note that having a full threshold, SPDZ-like, MPC protocol for SP makes the offline generation of commodity data much more expensive. Moreover, one will have to take into account that a SPDZ-like sharing involves a share of a MAC alongside every shared values. Meaning that the re-sharing procedure will also be more involved. Regarding the online phase where only the parties in CP are involved, we believe that with access to a pool of correlated randomness, the choice of a full threshold MPC scheme is more meaningful. Indeed, the online phase of the SPDZ protocol is almost as efficient as the one induced by a Q 2 access structure, but provides much more confidence when distrusting parties are involved. Therefore, as described above, our focus will be on a Q 2 access structure for SP and a full threshold for CP. In practice, our setting also gives us the advantage that the computing parties can choose the minimal subset of service providers that respect the Q 2 property and is geographically the closest to optimize the latency of their communication.
With this notation, we now distinguish four different phases for our commodity MPC model as presented in Figure 1 :
(1) First the service providers SP pre-compute Beaver triples.
(2) Then the computing parties CP send a commodity request via a ledger to SP.
The service providers answer to this request by sharing authenticated triples to the computing parties; with no interaction between the parties in SP. (4) Eventually the computing parties run the computationally cheap online phase of the SPDZ protocol.
In this model, the last three phases respect Beaver's commodity model exposed in [3] and only the first step deviates by requiring the commodity servers to communicate with each other. In this paper we will utilize two distinct linear secret-sharing schemes (LSSS). The first one is a multiplicative secret sharing scheme over n parties implementing a Q 2 complete monotone access structure denoted by ⟨·⟩ n,S , the second one is a full threshold additive sharing over m parties denoted by [[·]] m . The sharing [[·]] m is authenticated in that each share consists of an additive sharing of schemes give rise to MPC protocols which are actively secure with abort, the former, leveraging the multiplicative property, uses classic protocols (see [22] for a modern presentation), and the latter using the SPDZ protocol [11] . The ⟨·⟩ n,S LSSS will be used for the parties in SP and the [[·]] m LSSS will be used for the parties in CP.
Our computing parties CP, we assume, want to run a dishonest majority MPC protocol, based (say) on SPDZ. Thus they have an efficient online protocol which can evaluate any function, as long as they have access to a functionality providing the authenticated (i.e. MAC'd) Beaver triples F CP, A
Prep,[[·]] m
; namely the SPDZ offline phase for the LSSS [[·]] m . The computing parties CP want to outsource this pre-processing to a set of commodity servers SP. Here we assume that the commodity servers SP operate in an honest majority setting, with an access structure S which is Q 2 . The computing parties select a subset SP r of the SP that also satisfies the Q 2 property, and reserve a set of authenticated Beaver triples via a transaction on the ledger. Note that the commodity servers have no knowledge of the MAC key held by the computing parties, and that each request to the commodity servers can be from a different set of computing parties.
The commodity servers produce their own offline data, which is essentially Beaver triples with respect to the Q 2 multiplicative secret sharing scheme, via access to an offline functionality
. This is a functionality which produces Beaver triples with respect to the ⟨·⟩ n,S LSSS. The precise nature of how F SP, A Prep, ⟨·⟩ n,S is implemented will not bother us (but see for example [22] ). What is of concern to us, is how the commodity servers respond to the request from the computing parties, namely a protocol Π SP→CP, A Our work thus bridges the gap between step 1a and step 1d of Figure 1 by proposing a secure protocol for step 1c. Informally, the service providers compute a lot of triples interactively before reading a request on the ledger from a computing group CP. With the commodity request, the selected subset in SP receives a ⟨·⟩ r ,S resharing of the [·] m -shared MAC key held by the computing parties.
By using standard re-sharing techniques, the parties in the subset of SP are able to translate their sharing of correlated randomness from their honest majority sharing scheme to the full threshold one of CP.
Thanks to the ⟨·⟩ r ,S -sharing of the [·] m -sharing of the MAC key received along with the commodity request and to the cost of one multiplication (and hence one ⟨·⟩ r ,S Beaver-triple) per field element that is re-shared from SP to CP, parties in SP are also able to create the sharing of the MAC-value required by the online phase of the SPDZ [11] protocol.
We note that unlike previous work, our protocol permits the parties in SP to create the sharing of the MAC-value of any value with respect to a MAC key held by the parties in CP without requiring any interaction after the commodity request. Therefore the novelty of this work is that phases Figure 1b -1c match Beaver's commodity paradigm, allowing the exchange of commodities in only two communication rounds between SP, the Ledдer and CP, and no interaction between the SP after the offline step. Unlike Beaver's model, the parties in SP do need to communicate in the first phase, and we also require a Ledдer , for which a blockchain seems to be a good candidate.
We end this introduction with a quick overview of what follows: In Section 2 we briefly introduce the notion of Linear Secret Sharing Schemes and describe the offline phase of SPDZ that we want to emulate via our commodity protocol. We then introduce our notations. In Section 3 we explain the main steps of our protocol and state our main theorem. We continue by formally defining Π R→Q , A Prep and give a simulator that proves our theorem in the UC framework. We finish by Section 4 in which we give some conclusions and further thoughts.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section we first briefly introduce the concept of multiplicative Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS), and the MPC protocols associated with them. In particular we discuss protocols in the SPDZ family, i.e. ones based on an offline phase which produces Beaver triples, in more detail. We finish the section by introducing Session: Multiparty Computation CCSW '19, November 11, 2019, London, United Kingdom an ideal functionality for a ledger, which we use to keep a log on every transactions that happened.
Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
Recall, we use ⟨·⟩ n,S to denote a mulitplicative LSSS with a Q 2 access structure S over n parties, and [[·]] m to denote a full threshold mutliplicative LSSS over m parties. The Q 2 sharing ⟨·⟩ n,S will be used as the basis of the sharing for the commodity servers SP, whilst the full threshold sharing [[·]] m will be used as the sharing for the computing parties CP. We let SP = {SP 1 , . . . , SP n } and
The ⟨·⟩ n,S -sharing:. To define the ⟨·⟩ n,S we must first introduce the notion of a complete monotone access structure, and what it means to be Q 2 .
Definition 2.1. Let P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } be a set of parties, Γ ∈ 2 P the monotonically increasing set of qualified set and ∆ ∈ 2 P the monotonically decreasing set of unqualified set. If Γ ∩ ∆ = ∅ then (Γ, ∆) is a monotone access structure. If in addition it holds that ∆ = 2 P \ Γ, then the access structure is said to be complete.
In the following we will only consider complete monotone access structure, and will refer to those simply as access structure. We remark that such an access structure is completely defined by P and either one of the qualified set or unqualified set. Therefore we will often talk about Γ access structure or ∆ access structure to refer to the (Γ, ∆) access structure. For an access structure to be Q 2 we now require an additional property.
sharing of a ∈ F p , with F p a field of size p for p a prime power, and S a Q 2 access structure on n parties, is defined as ⟨a⟩ n,S such that any qualified set of parties Q can reconstruct the secret a from a linear combination of their shares.
In the rest of the paper when talking about LSSS we implicitly mean multiplicative LSSS, define as in 2.4.
Definition 2.4.
A LSSS is said to be multiplicative if given two sharings of two secrets s and s ′ , the product s · s ′ is a linear sum of the Schur product (the local tensor product) of the shares of the secrets.
To abstract away from any specific scheme, it is easier to think about Q2 LSSS through Monotone Span Programs (MSPs). This model of computation was first described by Karchmer and Wigderson [15] , and has been shown to induce LSSSs. We will only informally describe how to use a MSP to derive a LSSS, and refer the reader to [22] for more details. Informally a MSP is defined by . We note that the definition of a MSP implies that for any qualified set, i.e. any subset Q ∈ Γ, there exists a recombination vector λ Q such that ⟨λ Q , s Q ⟩ = s, where s Q denotes the entries of the vector s held by parties in Q.
In the following we will denote by ⟨a⟩ n,S = (a 1 , . . . , a l ) a Q 2 sharing of a. We define a i = ⟨a⟩ i n,S . We also associate such sharing with the labeling function ι : {1, . . . , l } → P such that the share a i of a is held by the party ι(i). We note that ι need not to be bijective, because it is not always injective. Therefore, when we refer to ι −1 (SP i ) for a party SP i ∈ SP, we refer to the rows of the matrix M owned by this party.
An example of such scheme, that we use as an example throughout this paper, is the Shamir sharing, for which the MPC protocol of [22] makes use of the fact that if one receives t + 1 shares then not only can one reconstruct the secret a, but one can also detect (with high probability if p is large) if an adversarial set has given one invalid share. This fact is used to produce an actively secure with abort MPC protocol for honest majority. Thus, in some sense, the Shamir LSSS is self authenticating. The MSP representation of
To define the [[·]] m notation we first introduce a basic full threshold sharing, with no authentication.
Unlike the Shamir scheme the LSSS given by [·] m is not self authenticating. Thus in the SPDZ papers [10, 11] the authors introduce an authenticated full threshold LSSS. Definition 2.6. An authenticated full threshold m-party additive secret sharing of a ∈ F p , with F p a finite field of size p a prime power, is defined as 
Pseudo-Random Secret Sharing
We will make use of the functionality F P, A PRSS, ⟨·⟩ n,S given in Figure 2 , which we take from [22] . In the case of Shamir sharing (for smallish values of t and n) one can obtain this functionality efficiently without interaction, using well known techniques dating back to [8] . For other access structures, or larger values of t and n, one can easily obtain this functionality using interaction.
SPDZ-Like MPC Protocols
We assume that we aim to produce MPC protocols for arithmetic circuits over F p , for a prime p. To simplify our presentation we
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Ideal Functionality F P,A PRSS,⟨·⟩ n,S On input P RSS (count ) from all parties, if the counter value is the same for all parties and has not been used before, the functionality samples a ← F p , computes share vector ⟨a ⟩ n,S and sends ⟨a ⟩ k n,S to P ι(k ) . Figure 2 : Ideal Functionality F PRSS, ⟨·⟩ n,S require p to be large enough such that 1/p is a negligible function of the security parameter λ. Improvements in the protocols we use can alleviate this constraint, but we keep to the case of large p for ease of exposition.
Input: On input (I nput , i, id , x ) from party i and (I nput , i, id ) from all other parties, with id a fresh identifier and x ∈ F p , store (id , x ).
Add: On command (Add , id 1 , id 2 , id 3 ) from all parties in P (where id 1 and id 2 are present in memory), retrieve (id 1 , x ) and (id 2 , y) and store (id 3 , x + y).
Multiply: On command (Mul t iply, id 1 , id 2 , id 3 ) from all parties in P (where id 1 and id 2 are present in memory), retrieve (id 1 , x ) and (id 2 , y) and store (id 3 , x · y).
Output: On input (Output , id ) from all honest parties (where id is present in memory), retrieve (id , z), output z to the adversary.
If the adversary responds OK then output the value z to all parties, otherwise output ABORT to all parties.
Figure 3: Ideal MPC Functionality F MPC
Our goal is to produce an MPC protocol for a set of parties P, where an adversary controls a subset A. Such a protocol is given by the ideal functionality F MPC presented in Figure 3 . We will be examining MPC over different access structures. In particular the m computing parties wish to execute an MPC protocol for the full threshold case, i.e. the full set of parties are given by P = CP, and the adversary controls a subset A such that A ∩ P P. In the case of the n commodity servers they are essentially executing an MPC protocol (albeit only an offline phase) for a set of parties P = SP, and the adversary controls an unqualified subset A ∈ ∆.
In [10, 11] it is shown how to realise the functionality F MPC in the F P, A
Prep,[[·]] m
-hybrid model in the case where A ∩ P P, using the secret sharing scheme [[·]] m . See Figure 4 for the functionality
in this case. The functionality is a little different than the one presented in [21] as we do not allow the adversary to introduce an error in the Angle macro. Instead, as in [16] , the functionality generates the triples optimistically and allows the adversary to abort the protocol before sending out the shares. We also require the parties to send in a single message the set of handles T ′ on the triple items and the sets of handles R 1 , . . ., R m on the input masks that each of the m parties will need. During the Initialise part of the pre-processing phase, the parties agree on a global MAC key α such that each party i ∈ P only knows a share α i of it, subject to i ∈ P α i = α. Then, each value x additively shared by the parties in the Preprocessing part of the offline phase is accompanied by an Ideal Functionality F P,A
Prep,[[·]]m
Initialise: On input (I nit ial ise, p, T , R 1 , . . ., R m ) from all players and the adversary:
(1) The functionality samples α ←$ F p to be the global MAC key.
(2) The functionality receives for each corrupted player i ∈ A a share α i . (1) The functionality accepts ({x i , γ (x ) i } i ∈A ) from the adversary.
(2) The functionality waits for the adversary to send a signal either ABORT or PROCEED. If ABORT, it aborts, otherwise it continues.
Otherwise i ∈ A so the functionality accepts r (k ) for k ∈ R i from the adversary. -For all i ∈ P, for k ∈ R i : (1) The functionality runs Angle(r (k ) ).
(2) For each j ∈ P , the functionality sends party j the pair (r (k ) j , γ (r (k ) ) j ). (2) The functionality calls Angle(a k ), 
We note that such a sharing trivially allows for linear operation without interaction, and hence additions are free and the Beaver multiplication [2] trick can be used to multiply two secret-shared values by consuming a pre-processed triple. The strength of the SPDZ protocol resides in the fact that at the end of the online phase, the parties can use the MAC scheme to verify that the adversary did not deviate from the protocol, and abort the protocol in case of malicious activities. In Figure 5 , taken from [22] , we present the equivalent offline phase for the multiplicative Q 2 secret sharing system. We use the notation F P, A Prep, ⟨·⟩ n,S to denote this offline functionality. It is shown in [22] how to realise the functionality F MPC in the F P, A Prep, ⟨·⟩ n,S hybrid model in the case where A ∈ ∆, but this time using the secret sharing scheme ⟨·⟩ n,S . On input (T r ipl e) from all parties, the functionality does the following:
(1)(a) Sample a, b ← F p and compute share vectors ⟨a ⟩ n,S and ⟨b ⟩ n,S .
) to the adversary. 
The Ledger
To make sure the service providers do not reshare twice the same commodities, every transaction has to be logged on a ledger. To do this we introduce the ideal functionality F Ledger in Figure 6 . The ledger stores which commodities are requested for each transactions, making sure that each commodity is reserved only once. The use of a ledger allows us to have an agreement in SP on which commodities have already been used without proceeding to a Byzantine Agreement after each requests. The latter solution would break the communication model we try to achieve. An implementation of such a ledger could be done via a smart contract executed over a public blockchain. In addition the ledger also stores the encrypted re-sharing of the MAC key destined for the service providers in SP r .
Ideal Functionality F Ledger
The functionality emulates a publicly readable, immutable, append only ledger. The functionality starts with two empty sets T = R = ∅.
Reserve. Upon receiving
∅ send FAIL to every parties in CP that have already sent a message. 
COMMODITY OFFLINE DATA
Our goal is to provide a protocol which allows the computing parties to obtain the Beaver triples needed for secure computation in an outsourced manner from a set of commodity servers. To make things more concrete we utilizes the two sets of parties defined above, the service providers SP and the computing parties CP. In practice, the service providers could be computationally powerful machines hosted in the cloud, producing Beaver triples as a service (TaaS) for low energy devices. We consider an active adversary A which can corrupt an unqualified set U ∈ ∆ of the n parties in SP AND m − 1 parties in CP.
The idea for our commodity MPC is to have parties in SP, which can run in the cloud, to execute the costly offline phase, generating pre-processing data in the ⟨.⟩ n,S -scheme. For this the parties in SP utilize the functionality F SP, A∩SP Prep, ⟨·⟩ n,S . The service providers then execute our re-sharing protocol below to transform the data from a ⟨.⟩ n,S -sharing to a [.] m -sharing, and add the correct MAC to it to make it a [[.]] m -sharing. The computing parties will then be able to use the data in an online phase of a SPDZ-like protocol. Thus the output of the protocol will be equivalent to the computing parties executing the functionality F CP, A∩CP
Prep,[[·]] m
. The offline data is therefore seen as commodities, which shall be computed independently of the parties that are going to use it. To be sure that the same data is not used more than once by SP, we use the public ledger to log every request made from the sets CPs to SP. In practice this ledger could be implemented via a blockchain.
Before proceeding with our protocol we present some observations:
-The computing parties are independent of the commodity parties (unlike the case considered in [21] ), because the preprocessing of triples can be done without knowing the MAC key held by CP. -On each application of the protocol with the commodity servers SP, there could be a new distinct set of computing parties CP, and hence a distinct MAC key α. Indeed even the same set of computing parties can utilize a different MAC key on each execution. -Contrary to Beaver's idea of commodity cryptography in our model the commodity servers SP do interact with each other. However, as opposed to the outsourcing protocol of [21] , the interaction amongst the commodity servers can all be done before the request of the computing parties. Thus the interaction between the parties in SP can itself be done in an offline manner.
Our protocol, which we call Π SP→CP, A Prep , will allow a set of computing parties CP to select a subgroup SP r of the set SP which is minimal to satisfy the Q 2 property and the geographically closest to them to optimize latency. The computing parties will then only interact with the commodity servers in SP r so as to realise the functionality F CP,CP∩A 
Overview of the protocol
In this section we first briefly describe the main steps of our protocol. We then formally define Π S P →CP, A P r ep and we prove its security, defined by theorem 3.1.
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First, independent from the potential sets of computing parties, the service providers continuously generate Beaver triples in the ⟨.⟩ n,S scheme. For each element of each triple, the service providers also need to pre-compute an additional triple associated to it, that we denote for e.g. ⟨a⟩ n,S by (⟨a a ⟩ n,S , ⟨b a ⟩ n,S , ⟨c a ⟩ n,S ).
Then when a group of computing parties wants to begin a computation, they generate an additively shared MAC key [α] m , and agree on a restricted set of service providers SP r ⊂ SP they will interact with. With the commodity request sent from CP to SP r (through the ledger), each CP i ∈ CP locally executes Transfor-mMac on its share α i of the MAC key, resulting in ⟨α i ⟩ r ,S . CP i then sends the shares of its share of α to parties in SP r according to the labeling function ι. Using only linear operations, the parties in SP r can now compute a sharing ⟨α⟩ r ,S of α. In the following we demonstrate how the service providers now have the ability to authenticate and reshare their precomputed triples non-interactively, to the cost of one additional triple per resharing.
To do so on e.g. a, all parties in SP r locally execute Trans-formShare on their ⟨a⟩ n,S sharing of a and also on their ⟨c a ⟩ n,S sharing of c a . They then send the resulting [a] m and [c a ] m appropriately to parties in CP. The service providers also broadcast their shares of ⟨a − a a ⟩ n,S and ⟨α − b a ⟩ r ,S to all the computing parties. The broadcast allows all CP i ∈ CP to securely reconstruct the values a − a a and α − b a by locally executing CheckOpening. Using the classic Beaver multiplication trick, it is now possible for the parties in CP to locally compute a share of the MAC value of a. At the end of this protocol, the computing parties hold [[a]] m , an authenticated sharing of a under their global MAC key α.
We now present the different subprotocols used above in our outline of the commodity protocol, and apply them to our (t, r ) Shamir sharing as an example.
First, Fig 8 shows how the parties in CP can securely transmit a sharing of their global MAC key α to parties in SP r . We note that in the detailed protocol described later, this subroutine is slightly modified to take into account the call to the F Ledger functionality.
In our example of a (t, r ) Shamir sharing, Fig 8 works as follow: We note that for all CP i ∈ CP we have
Plus m i=1 P α i is a sum of m degree t polynomials, therefore a degree t polynomial. By definition
is then a (t, r )-Shamir sharing of α. For the second step, in Fig 9 we describe the re-sharing from SP r to CP. For our Shamir sharing example Fig 9 transforms a ⟨·⟩ t ,r to a [[·]] m sharing. Given SP r t +1 ⊂ SP r of size t + 1, we have:
Finally, we have the opening subprotocol defined in Fig 10. This protocol is executed by the parties in CP to check correctness of the broadcast shares, and retrieve the secret value from them. Since we have a qualified set of honest parties in SP r , we know that among the r shares that are broadcast, enough shares come from honest service providers. Therefore if the subroutine does not output ⊥, all the service providers must have broadcast their correct share of a. We observe that in our example with a Shamir sharing, we can do this efficiently using a parity check matrix.
Informally we can see that our commodity protocol is secure because the adversary can only tamper with the shares of a and c a . Indeed, the checkOpening subroutine prevents the adversary to tamper with a − a a and α − b a . If the adversary decides to cheat by introducing errors 
To pass the MAC check, the adversary needs ϵ 2 = b a ϵ 1 , which with b a unkown, results in guessing with probability λ = 1 p for a finite field of size p.
Definition and security of Π SP→CP, A

P r ep
In this section we prove that Π SP→CP, A ,F Ledger )-hybrid model. The first two ideal functionalities are defined in [22] and all three are described respectively in Fig 5, 2 and 6 above. To prove theorem 3.1, we now analyze why the simulator described in Fig 12-13 gives the correct view to the environment.
Offline. : In the offline phase, the simulator behavior is straightforward. The simulator only emulates the hybrid functionalities for the offline phase of the ⟨·⟩ n,S scheme. This allows the simulator to know all the ⟨·⟩ n,S shares held by the adversary for the triples generated by F SP,SP∩A For each CP i ∈ CP:
(1) CP i creates a ⟨α i ⟩ r ,S = (α i ,1 , . . . , α i ,k ) sharing of its share α i of the MAC key. (2) CP i sends α i ,j to ι(j) ∩ SP r . The parties in SP r set ⟨α ⟩ r ,S = m i =1 ⟨α i ⟩ r ,S
Figure 8: Subroutine TransformMAC
Initialise. : In the initialise step, the simulator extracts the α i for i ∈ CP ∩ A from the sharing it receives from the adversary. This extraction requires that enough shares are seen by the simulator, meaning that SP r \ A must be a qualified set. The simulator also sets an abort flag to true if the re-sharing to the honest parties is not consistent, which would be detected later in the CheckOpening. The simulator creates dummy sharing of α i for i ∈ CP \ A and Note: From the definition of the ⟨. ⟩ n,S sharing, there exists a linear combination of the shares of ⟨a ⟩ n,S which sums up to a. We call β 1 , . . . , β k the public coefficients of this linear combination. , and keeps in memory ⟨ α i ⟩ r ,S and ⟨ α i ⟩ r ,S to be able to respond to read request to the ledger. The functionality will sample α ←$ F p and α i for i ∈ CP \ A such that α = i ∈CP\A α i + i ∈CP∩A α i . We note that in the end the environment has access to α , the α i for i ∈ CP \ A, the α i for i ∈ CP ∩ A, ⟨ α i ⟩ j r ,S for i ∈ CP ∩ A and ⟨ α i ⟩ j r ,S for i ∈ CP \ A for all ι(j) ∈ SP r ∩ A. But because SP r ∩ A ∈ ∆ and because the environment does not have access to the internal states of the honest parties, it is not able to check for correctness of the dummy ⟨ α i ⟩ r ,S against the α i for i ∈ CP\A. Therefore, the dummy ⟨ α i ⟩ r ,S made by the simulator looks random to the environment, as would the sharing of the real α i .
SFeedAndMAC. : Each parties in SP r ∩ A need to [.] m re-share their shares for the value x and also for the c x term of the associated triple to parties in CP \ A. As in [21] we note that having a corrupt party in CP ∩ A to receive a share of the re-share from a party in SP ∩ A and then introduce an error is equivalent to have the party in SP ∩ A to send a different re-share to the party in CP ∩ A. Therefore the simulator samples the shares destined to the corrupt parties CP∩ A as if no error was introduced. This is made possible because the adversary knows from the Offline step what are the shares held by SP r ∩ A. By doing so, the simulator produces re-sharings that do not contain any error and are consistent to what the environment expects. That means that the simulator receives { x j i } i ∈CP\A for the re-sharing of ⟨x⟩ j n,S from the adversary which controls the shares indexed by j ∈ ι −1 (SP r ∩ A), and the simulator samples
The proof is very similar to [21] . The idea is that when the adversary reshares to the honest parties, it does not commit to any error, because Protocol Π SP→CP,A
P r ep
Offline: Parties in SP precompute 4n T + n R triples and n R random shares:
-For i in {1, . . . , n T } (1) The parties in SP call F SP,SP∩A
Prep,⟨·⟩ n,S to obtain ( ⟨a i ⟩ n,S , ⟨b i ⟩ n,S , ⟨c i ⟩ n,S ).
(2) The parties in SP call F SP,SP∩A Prep,⟨·⟩ n,S to obtain ( ⟨a i a ⟩ n,S , ⟨b i a ⟩ n,S , ⟨c i a ⟩ n,S ). (2) The parties in SP call F SP,SP∩A Prep,⟨·⟩ n,S to obtain ( ⟨a i r ⟩ n,S , ⟨b i r ⟩ n,S , ⟨c i r ⟩ n,S ).
Initialise: All sets of computing parties CP do: On input (I nit ial ise, p, T ′ , R 1 , . . ., R m ) from all parties in CP:
If it fails, the parties in CP abort.
Macro: FeedAndMAC( ⟨x ⟩ n,S , ( ⟨a x ⟩ n,S , ⟨b x ⟩ n,S , ⟨c x ⟩ n,S )):
(1) The parties execute TransformShare( ⟨x ⟩ n,s ) and Trans-formShare( ⟨c x ⟩ n,s ).
(2) For each j ∈ ι −1 (SP r ), Party ι(j) sends ( ⟨x ⟩ 
Preprocessing: All parties SP i ∈ SP send (READ, SP i ) to F Ledger and for every set CP they are involved with:
-For CP i ∈ CP (1) For j in R i (a) Run FeedAndMAC( ⟨r j ⟩ n,S , ( ⟨a j r ⟩ n,S , ⟨b j r ⟩ n,S , ⟨c j r ⟩ n,S ). (b) For each k ∈ ι −1 (SP r ), Party ι(k ) sends ⟨r j ⟩ k n,S to Party CP i ∈ CP. (c) Party CP i ∈ CP executes checkOpening( ⟨r j ⟩ n,S ) and gets r j . -For i in T ′ (1) run FeedAndMAC( ⟨a i ⟩ n,S , ( ⟨a i a ⟩ n,S , ⟨b i a ⟩ n,S , ⟨c i a ⟩ n,S )) (2) do the same for ⟨b i ⟩ n,S and ⟨c i ⟩ n,S . the error is only defined when all the shares are set, during the computing phase of SP. Thus at the end the view for the environment is as it expects, containing the correct error, introduced by the adversary when it sets the shares for CP ∩ A for itself. Namely, at some point the adversary will decide on { x
in addition to the { x j i } i ∈CP\A that it sent to the simulator. It is only at this point that the error introduced by the adversary is really fixed. In consequence, at the end of the protocol the environment will end up with the faulty shares fixed by the adversary for itself. Thus fixing the error in combination with the shares forwarded to the ideal functionality. We note that the environment lacks access to the internal values of the honest parties. Therefore, even if the simulator does not know the values sampled by the functionality F CP,CP∩A
Prep,[[·]] m
, nor does the environment. This means that the access structures implies that there are always enough undefined shares Simulator S CP,CP∩A P r ep (2/2) Macro: SFeendAndMAC( ⟨x ⟩ n,S , ( ⟨a x ⟩ n,S , ⟨b x ⟩ n,S , ⟨c x ⟩ n,S )) Preprocessing: The simulator receives (READ, SP i ) from parties in SP, and responds appropriately with adversary and dummy data to each request, as would the F Ledger functionality. When it has receive (READ, SP i ) from all the SP i parties of a RESERVE request, the simulator does the following:
-For CP i in CP (1) For k in R i .
(2) If CP i is in A, the simulator sends r k to the functionality F CP,CP∩A Prep,[[·]]m . (3) The simulator runs SFeedAndMAC(⟨r k ⟩ n,S , ( ⟨a r k ⟩ n,S ,⟨b r k ⟩ n,S , ⟨c r k ⟩ n,S )). (4) If CP i is in A, the simulator sends r k to CP i . -For k in T ′ (1) The simulator runs SFeedAndMAC(⟨a k ⟩ n,S , ( ⟨a a k ⟩ n,S ,⟨b a k ⟩ n,S , ⟨c a k ⟩ n,S ). to enable the simulation of the offline phase during the computing phase of CP. In particular the re-sharing of dummy values done in step (3) of the macro in the simulator looks random to the environment, as would the re-sharing of the real values. In the last communication phase of the macro, the simulator receives from the adversary the shares of the two substractions. Thanks to the MAC extraction during the Initialise step, the simulator checks them for correctness and abort if need be to emulate the OpenCheck subroutine.
Preprocessing. Apart from the call to SFeedAndMAC which security is discussed above, the simulator only has to make sure that the r k values that parties in CP ∩ A should receive corresponds to the sharing the honest parties have. That is why, when the r k is destined to a party controlled by the adversary r k is sent to the (2), and then revealed to the adversarial party in step (4).
Performance
We have designed our protocol such that the computationally expensive offline phase of the SPDZ protocol can be outsourced to a set of service providers. By analyzing the above protocol, we observe that the cost for parties in CP is relatively low, as they only need to compute one encryption per parties in SP r (which sums up to r public-key encryptions), write their request on the ledger and receive 12 field elements per triples and 4 field elements per input mask. Those figures are to compare with the offline phase of SPDZ [17] . For a prime of bit length 64 and two parties [17] advertises a communication of 9 kbit per triples, whereas in theory our protocol only requires 12 · 2 · 64 = 1536 bits of communication. We also note that the use of a ledger is costly in terms of latency, from a few seconds to a few minutes depending on the underlying agreement procedure, but cheap in terms of computation. Whereas the FHE operations (or OTs) require some computational power. Therefore we argue that our protocol provides an interesting trade-off in terms of communication and computational power, for low-power devices.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown that Beaver's vision of commodity cryptography exposed in [3] is still relevant in today's cryptography. Especially now, with the trend on computation on encrypted data which requires computationally heavy public key cryptography. But also the growth of cloud computing, with service providers that have access to extensive computing power.
We have defined and proved secure a new protocol which can help a group of low-energy computing devices to achieve secure computation, with the help of the cloud. In fact, our protocol allows for a set of computing parties to outsource the offline phase of the SPDZ [11] protocol. Doing so, the computing parties are left with computing the online phase, which is mainly information theoretic primitives, making it computationally cheap to run.
Our communication model does not fall exactly into Beaver's vision of commodity cryptography. However, after the initial communication amongst service providers to produce raw triples, they need not to communicate. Which makes the actual re-sharing and MAC-ing procedure to match the communication model envisioned by Beaver. Plus this work improves on previous work where the service providers needed to communicate throughout the protocol, and induces an overhead of only four triples to re-share one to the computing parties.
Because we use a public, immutable ledger for logging all requests for commodities, it might be of interest in the future to look at how one could leverage the functionalities offered by smart contracts to make TaaS available on a blockchain.
